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This paper aims to identify and discuss four major sources of power in negotiations. 
Findings 
The four sources of power are alternatives, information, status and social capital. Each of these sources of 
power can enhance a negotiator’s likelihood of obtaining their ideal outcome because power allows 
negotiators to be more confident and proactive, and it shields them from the bargaining tactics of their 
opponents. 
Practical implications 
The paper discusses how negotiators can utilize each source of power to improve their negotiation 
outcomes. 
Originality/value 
The paper provides a parsimonious definition of power in negotiations, identifies the four major sources 









Success at the bargaining table often comes down to one simple factor: power. Even when not explicitly 
identified, power is frequently the precipitating and driving force of negotiation processes and outcomes. 
Yet, power is a multifaceted construct that can take many forms and be derived from a variety of sources. 
In this article, we identify four important sources of power at the bargaining table: alternatives, 
information, status and social capital. We first provide a formal definition of power in negotiations that 
integrates and goes beyond how past research has conceptualized this critical construct. Building on this 
definition, we then discuss how each of the four sources of power help negotiators achieve their goals. 
Finally, we discuss the psychological and behavioral consequences of power in a negotiation. 
 
Defining power in negotiations 
A review of the literature on power and negotiations reveals two surprising facts: first, despite the 
sizeable body of research on the effects of power in negotiations (for reviews see Brett and Thompson, 
2016; Kim et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2010), there is currently no parsimonious definition of what 
power means for negotiators at the bargaining table. Second, when power is studied in negotiations, it is 
most often conceptualized around a negotiator’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement or BATNA 
(Fisher and Ury, 1991). However, this conceptualization is too narrow to capture the full range of power 
in negotiations. We argue that power in negotiations goes beyond the alternatives a party has and can 
include other important sources. Thus, a more general conceptualization of power in negotiations is 
needed to reflect the fact that power can emerge from a variety of factors. 
Power outside of negotiations has been defined as “asymmetric control over valued resources in social 
relations” (Magee and Galinsky, 2008, p. 361). Our interest is in the power that negotiators wield to 
achieve success at the bargaining table. Although alternatives, information, status and social capital can 
be conceptualized as resources, in negotiations the definition of power needs to connect to the eventual 
outcome. 
We define power in negotiations as the probability that a negotiator will influence a negotiation outcome 
in the direction of his or her ideal outcome.1 Thus, the more power one has, the higher the probability that 
a negotiator will achieve his or her goals at the bargaining table. For example, an employee who is 
negotiating a salary increase with her boss and has a strong alternative offer from another firm (i.e. an 
attractive BATNA) has a higher probability of getting a raise than if she had a weak outside offer or no 
offer at all. If she lets that BATNA go, her power diminishes; she no longer has that source of leverage. 
One advantage of our definition is that it not only includes economic sources of power (BATNA) but also 
encompasses other personal and social characteristics that can serve as sources of power. For example, 
when a negotiator has reliable information about their counterparty’s willingness to pay, they can 
leverage that information to increase the probability of realizing their aspirations. 
Our definition also implies that in negotiations, power is a relative concept. Indeed, negotiations involve 
at least two parties. For example, although a negotiator with a strong BATNA will have a higher 
likelihood of obtaining their ideal outcome at the bargaining table than a negotiator with a weak BATNA, 
a strong BATNA will be relatively less valuable if one’s counterpart also has a strong BATNA. Thus, the 
                                                          
1 Although negotiators often strive to maximize their own profits, a negotiator’s ideal outcome might be to cooperate 
or to be generous towards the other side (Handgraaf et al., 2008). As a result, when the powerful feel responsible for 
the other side, they might make more concessions and be more generous (Chen et al., 2001). 
 3 
 
probability of a favorable outcome depends not only on one negotiator’s alternatives, information, status 
and social capital but also on their counterpart’s sources of power. 
 
The four horsemen of power at the bargaining table 
Having defined power in a negotiation and outlined its dynamic nature, we now turn to outlining four 
common and important sources of power at the bargaining table. 
 
The first horseman of power: alternatives (BATNA) 
The strength of one’s alternatives is often considered the most important source of power in negotiations 
because it so clearly determines one’s dependence on a given negotiation. When individuals have a strong 
BATNA going into a negotiation, they are less dependent on the opposing party to reach their goals than 
when they have a weak alternative or no alternative at all (Emerson, 1962; Pinkley et al., 1994; Schaerer 
et al., 2015). 
Negotiators have greater power when they have more, and more valuable, alternatives. A valuable outside 
offer allows a negotiator to put pressure on the opponent, for example, by threatening to leave the 
bargaining table if the value of one’s BATNA is not met. Even if the value of any one alternative is not 
particularly high, power can also come from having multiple alternatives. Indeed, negotiators who have 
multiple rather than a single alternative feel more powerful (Schaerer et al., 2016). Furthermore, in 
markets characterized by high demand (i.e. with many potential transaction partners), negotiators receive 
better outcomes than in markets with low demand (McAlister et al., 1986). Thus, having multiple 
negotiation alternatives, particularly if at least one of them is highly attractive, can be an important source 
of power for negotiators. 
Alternatives, however, can hurt one’s outcomes when they anchor negotiators or lead them to satisfice on 
inferior outcomes. For example, having a weak alternative can be worse than having no alternatives at all 
because unattractive alternatives serve as low anchors that depress one’s first offers (Schaerer et al., 
2015). Similarly, having multiple alternatives can backfire when negotiators use these alternatives as 
reference points when determining their offers. In one study, negotiators who had two alternatives (e.g. 
$80 and $90) made less ambitious first offers than negotiators who had only one of the two alternatives 
(e.g. $80 or $90) because multiple alternatives anchored negotiators more strongly than a single one 
(Schaerer et al., 2016). Having fallback options can also negatively affect people’s motivation and 
persistence in striving for their ideal targets (Shin and Milkman, 2016). To the extent that negotiators are 
willing to accept their fallback option, having a “just good enough” alternative can cause a negotiator to 
leave value on the table. 
In sum, alternatives are a major source of power in negotiation, used as leverage to influence a 
negotiation toward one’s ideal outcome. Negotiators, however, should not embrace any alternative, as 
they need to be aware of potential side-effects of too weak or too many modest alternatives. 
 
The second horseman of power: information 
A second source of power comes from having negotiation-relevant information. For example, it is very 
valuable to have information about the other side’s preferences or reservation price. If a negotiator learns 
 4 
 
the other side’s reservation price, they can simply make an offer that is only marginally better than that 
reservation price. As we mentioned earlier, power in a negotiation is relative, so having information about 
the other side’s sources of power, particularly their alternatives, is a key to successful negotiating 
(Pinkley, 1995). Overall, having market information, knowledge of cultural practices, insight into a 
counterparty’s anxieties or general expertise in negotiations can increase the probability that one achieves 
an ideal outcome (Brett, 2000). 
All of these types of information are sources of power because they offer clear strategic advantages. 
When a negotiator learns about the preferences and priorities of the other side, they can leverage that 
information. For example, sometimes both negotiators want the same outcome on an issue (e.g. both a 
recruiter and a candidate want the candidate to be in a particular city). The first negotiator to reveal their 
preference and thus the fact that the issue is a compatible, one puts themselves in a low-power position; 
the other side can then pretend that they have a different preference to extract concessions on other issues 
(Loschelder et al., 2014). Similarly, knowing that a salesperson needs a sale to get an year-end 
commission bonus or that a company needs to reduce inventory to lower their tax rate can be leveraged to 
secure a lower price. 
Negotiators can gain information in three ways. First, they can do their homework and due diligence, 
seeking out information prior to the negotiation. Sometimes, however, information about a negotiation 
counterpart is difficult to obtain without asking the counterpart directly (Srivastava et al., 2000; 
Thompson, 2011). Thus, a second method is to ask questions during the negotiation: Why do you want to 
buy this object? What are you preferences on this issue? Third, negotiators can engage in perspective-
taking (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky et al., 2008a, 2008b) by trying to make educated 
guesses about the counterpart’s priorities and goals. 
As one example, consider the information one of the authors had when he purchased a condominium. 
First, he knew about the other side’s alternatives or the lack of alternatives in this case, as the owner of 
the condo had received no other offers. Second, he knew the owner was sitting on two mortgages and that 
the price of the new place was double the value of the condo being sold. These two pieces of information 
helped him appreciate the seller was feeling pressure to sell the condo. Third, he knew how much the 
owner had originally paid for the condo that was being sold. Fourth, he knew comparable selling prices of 
other units in the building that had the same floor plan. These pieces of information allowed him to make 
an offer that was far below the asking price but one that would still give the seller a reasonable profit and 
thus make it likely that a negotiated agreement would be reached. 
 
The third horseman of power: status 
The third horseman of power in negotiations is status – the extent to which a negotiator is respected by 
the other side (Brett and Thompson, 2016; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Although status hierarchies are 
subjective (Blau, 1964; Goldhamer and Shils, 1939), there tends to be a high degree of consensus about 
who does and does not have high status (Anderson et al., 2006; Devine, 1989). 
Low-status individuals tend to defer to their higher-status counterparts (Berger et al., 1972; Berger and 
Zelditch, 1985). In negotiations, this means that the equivalent demands would be more likely to be 
granted to a high-status negotiator than a low-status negotiator. High-status actors are also viewed as 
more competent than lower status actors (Rivera, 2011, 2015), get compensated more (Belliveau et al., 
1996) and are favored as interaction partners (Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Podolny, 2005). These effects 
of high status all suggest that status provides access to valuable opportunities and assets (Baum and 
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Oliver, 1992; Phillips, 2001). In fact, people tend to put more trust into high-status actors (for a review, 
see Sauder et al., 2012). Thus, status can be a valuable asset when there are few other players in the 
market to negotiate with. As a result of these processes, high-status negotiators can generally ask for more 
value for the same offering than can low-status negotiators (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). 
 
The fourth horseman of power: social capital 
The fourth horseman of power is social capital. Power in a negotiation can come from establishing and 
maintaining a large or strong social network (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). By increasing the number and 
strength of connections, negotiators also increase the likelihood of improving their alternatives (e.g. many 
people find jobs through friends and relatives; Montgomery, 1991), the capacity to acquire valuable 
information (e.g. market information, information about the opponent’s alternatives) (Shane and Cable, 
2002) and the probability they are seen as having high status (Cook and Emerson, 1978). Thus, social 
capital is not only its own source of power but also acts as a facilitator for other types of power. 
For social networks to be valuable to negotiators, connections do not necessarily have to be close friends 
and allies. Sometimes, so called “weak ties” – or social relationships characterized by infrequent 
interaction and a low level of closeness – can be just as useful as strong ties as they require less 
maintenance but can be activated when needed (Granovetter, 1973; Levin et al., 2011). 
 
When the horsemen ride together 
We have ordered the horsemen in what we see as their relative importance. On average, having a strong 
BATNA or more information more strongly drives negotiations towards one’s ideal outcome than having 
high status or rich social capital (Lee et al., 2017). One reason for this lies in the fact that alternatives and 
information can be leveraged more directly in a negotiation, whereas the benefits of status and social 
capital operate in a more indirect way. Of course, having multiple sources of power is better than having a 
single source of power. And, as we noted above, these sources of power tend to reinforce each other 
(Magee and Galinsky, 2008). 
It is important to note that the relative importance of these sources of power may fluctuate from context to 
context. For instance, in cultures characterized by high power distance, such as China, Korea or Japan, the 
relative importance of status or occupying a prominent social network position goes up and the relative 
importance of one’s BATNA goes down; that is, a low-status individual in a high-power distance culture 
will be less able to leverage their BATNA or their inside information than will a low-status individual in a 
low power distance culture (Lee et al., 2017). 
 
How power influences negotiation outcomes 
Power increases the probability that individuals will achieve their ideal outcomes in part because power 
has transformative effects on individuals’ psychological states (Keltner et al., 2003; Galinsky et al., 
2015). When one has power, one feels powerful. As a result of these psychological changes, power makes 
negotiators more ambitious and protects them from contextual influences. Power boosts ambitions 
because it leads to confidence, optimism and proactive behavior that propel negotiators to ask for more. 
Power also protects individuals from outside pressures and, in turn, makes them less likely to fall prey to 




Powerful weapons: power boosts negotiator confidence, optimism, proactive behavior and persuasion 
Power infuses people with a sense of optimism (Anderson and Galinsky, 2006) and confidence (Fast et 
al., 2012; See et al., 2011; Tost et al., 2012) while leading them to experience less physiological stress 
(Schmid and Schmid Mast, 2013) and to speak with a steadier voice (Ko et al., 2014). The powerful can 
more effectively tap into their underlying interests (Kifer et al., 2013; Kraus et al., 2011) and see the big 
picture (Magee et al., 2010; Smith and Trope, 2006). Finally, the powerful are more persuasive and 
articulate themselves more effectively (Kilduff and Galinsky, 2013; Lammers et al., 2013; Schmid and 
Schmid Mast, 2013). 
All of these effects lead the powerful to behave more proactively throughout the negotiation process. 
When people feel powerful at the bargaining table, they are more likely to decide to negotiate and ask for 
more rather than simply accepting an offer as is (Magee et al., 2007). In the context of job negotiations, 
this can have very significant financial outcomes for the would-be negotiator. Babcock and Laschever 
(2007) found that not all graduating seniors attempted to negotiate their job offers. However, those who 
did negotiate earned, on average, $5,000 more. Although a $5,000 difference may not seem like a huge 
sum, given a conservative rate of 3 per cent in both raises and interest, by age 60, those who chose to 
initiate a negotiation would have $568,834 more! 
The powerful are more likely to make the first offer and make an ambitious first offer. In one study, 
having a strong alternative led negotiators to be three times more likely to try to make the first offer 
(Magee et al., 2007). In other research, the higher the value of negotiators’ BATNA, the more ambitious 
the first offers they made (Schaerer et al., 2015). The value of the first offer is incredibly important 
because it has a strong impact on final agreements (Galinsky et al., 2009; Gunia et al., 2013). Overall, 
power translates into better outcomes by leading negotiators to be proactively ambitious – to negotiate 
rather than accept an offer, to make the first offer and to make ambitious offers. 
 
Powerful shields: power protects negotiators from the tactics of the other side 
Power also benefits negotiators by inoculating them from social and contextual influences. The powerful 
tend to be less influenced by the situation and can thus act more in line with their own goals (Guinote and 
Cai, 2016). Indeed, those who have a lot of power are less likely to conform to the opinions of others 
compared to those who have little power and are less influenced by the status and reputation of the other 
side (Galinsky et al., 2008a, 2008b). Power also protects negotiators from emotional tactics used by 
negotiation opponents. For example, powerful negotiators remain unimpressed by their opponent’s anger 
expressions, whereas their powerless counterparts concede more to an angry opponent than to a happy 
opponent (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Elevated power even immunizes negotiators from sympathy appeals by 
other parties (Van Kleef et al., 2008). 
In addition, power can help people see novel ways of thinking about problems and make them less likely 
to conform to the offers that other parties have already put on the table (Galinsky et al., 2008a, 2008b). 







In this article, we have outlined four prominent sources of power in negotiations – alternatives, 
information, status and social capital. These sources of power play a direct role in shaping the dynamics 
of exchange in most negotiations: they alter both the explicit strategic behavior of negotiators and their 
implicit behavior. Those who hold the balance of power are more ambitious and protected from influence 
attempts by the other side. The savvy negotiator knows to maximize these sources of power so that the 
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